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Clark Thomborson
Abstract—Inspired by the design patterns of object-oriented
software architecture, we offer an initial set of “privacy patterns”.
Our intent is to describe the most important ways in which
software systems can offer privacy to their stakeholders. We
express our privacy patterns as class diagrams in the UML
(Universal Modelling Language), because this is a commonly-
used language for expressing the high-level architecture of an
object-oriented system. In this initial set of privacy patterns,
we sketch how each of Westin’s four states of privacy can be
implemented in a software system. In addition to Westin’s states
of Solitude, Intimacy, Anonymity, and Reserve, we develop a
privacy pattern for an institutionalised form of Intimacy which
we call Confidence.
Index Terms—Privacy modeling, privacy analysis, software
system architecture, UML class diagram.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy requirements are problematic for any globally-
accessible computer system, because of significant differences
in the conceptions of privacy by stakeholders with various le-
gal traditions, cultures, religions, and individual desires. We do
not attempt to survey these variations here. Instead, we elicit
an initial set of “privacy patterns” from Westin’s influential
monograph [1], in which he identified four primary “states”
of privacy: Solitude, Intimacy, Anonymity, and Reserve.
In this article, we provide initial answers to the following
questions.
• What architectural features of a software system will
make it possible for its stakeholders to enjoy Westin’s
four states of privacy, whenever they are desirable and
feasible?
• Are there some “privacy patterns” which could be added
to the “design patterns” of the Gamma et al. [2], so that
the architectural foundations for stakeholder privacy can
be introduced at an early stage of system design?
• Are there any obvious gaps in the coverage of our initial
set of privacy patterns?
We assume our reader has some prior knowledge of object-
oriented design and the Universal Modelling Language (UML)
[3], [4], [5].
In Section 2, we present our initial set of privacy patterns
as UML class diagrams. These patterns provide an adequate
foundation for the privacy-aware management of personal
identities.
In Section 3, we present subclasses of Entity, allowing
us to distinguish between natural persons (who have privacy
requirements) and other actors, such as computer systems, who
do not have privacy requirements.
In Section 4, we present patterns for three contexts in which
privacy requirements may arise for stakeholders.
• In the Isolated context, a stakeholder is in Solitude.
• In the Secluded context, stakeholders are in Intimacy.
Fig. 1. Five states of privacy, adapted from Westin [1]
• In the Public Sphere, stakeholders may enjoy Anonymity,
and are expected to fulfill the social contract of Reserve.
In Section 5, we present a complicated context, which we
call Trusting. Formally, the Trusting context may be consid-
ered an elaboration of the Secluded context defined in Section
4. However the Trusting context has so many additional
elements, and is so commonly invoked in legal discussions
of informational privacy, that we have defined Confidence as
a fifth subclass of the PrivacyState. See Figure 1.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF STRUCTURAL PRIVACY
In this section, we describe a class structure which supports
a contextualised identity for every identifiable entity. The four
classes of Figure 2, and their four associations, embody our
first four privacy patterns. We describe each of these patterns
in turn below. These first four patterns are foundational: all of
our other privacy patterns are elaborations, that is, subclasses,
of classes and associations in Figure 2.
Please note that all four of the classes in Figure 2 are
abstract, as indicated by the italic font in their name. Concrete
subclasses of these classes are defined in later sections of this
article.
Privacy Pattern 1: Entity-aspect separation. Entities such
as humans or computerised systems display one or more
Aspects. The identifier for an Aspect does not immediately
reveal the identity of the Entity who displays this aspect. Every
Aspect must be displayed by an Entity; a system should not
allow “orphan” Aspects.
The structural constraint against orphanage is indicated by
the filled-in diamond on the “displays” association between an
Entity and an Aspect in Figure 2.
If an instance Alice of Entity is human, then Alice may
display one set of characteristics and behaviours when she is
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2Fig. 2. An entity displays an aspect, whenever it enacts a role in a context.
Contextualised roles may have powers to control and observe the activities of
other participants in a context. Collectively, a context may be embodied as an
entity which displays an aspect in order to enact a role in some higher-order
context.
at work, another set of characteristics and behaviours in her
social life, and a third set of characteristics and behaviours
in her family life. For analytic purposes, we may reify these
three sets as “aspects of Alice”. Alice may herself be such an
analyst, and may be consciously separating her contact-lists
and login identities into these three subsets.
This design pattern, if embodied in every computer system
that is used by Alice, will ensure that the knowledge of any one
of her work-login identities will not provide an immediate link
to any of her extremely-private characteristics and behaviours
(i.e. those which are not displayed in any of her aspects), nor to
any of the characteristics or behaviours which Alice displays
to her family and friends.
We consider this pattern to be a fundament of privacy-aware
system design. We’re not alone in this belief. Cameron’s laws
of identity refer to a “unidirectional identifier” [6]. The Jericho
Forum’s first identity commandment contains the requirement
that “Core identifiers must only be connected to a persona via
a one-way linkage (one-way trust).” [7] Please note that there
are some terminological differences in our expression of this
design pattern. Where we write “Entity”, the commandment
uses the phrase “core identifier”. Where we write “Aspect”,
the commandment uses the word “persona”.
We suggest that the word “persona” should be used only
when referring to an Aspect of a subclass NaturalPerson of
Entity, as will be defined in the next section. Our reasoning is
that the privacy rights and expectations of a human (a.k.a. a
natural person, in legal discourse) may be directly supported
by this design pattern in its subcase of an entity-persona
separation, and they may be indirectly supported by this design
pattern in its general case of an entity-aspect separation. Using
a different name for the Persona subclass of an Aspect would,
we suggest, allow requirement analysts and systems architects
to communicate more accurately and succinctly.
In Latin, persona is an actor’s mask, connoting that it is
worn by a human when playing a role in a play. A play would
be represented as an instance of a Context in our class system.
If an actor were a completely-computerised entity, we think it
would be most appropriate to use an inhuman word such as
“interface” rather than “persona” when speaking of its aspects.
Linguistically: all of the classes in our patterns are concrete
nouns. The relations between classes are verbs. Interfaces are
abstract nouns or occasionally adjectives. Our class diagrams
thus define a specialised ontology for the discussion of privacy
in complex systems.
Readers who are not familiar with the concept of a design
pattern may imagine that it is a prescriptive form of architec-
tural description i.e. specifying absolute requirements on its
structural design. However a design pattern is not prescriptive,
instead it is a trope or commonly-used design motif.
Design patterns capture solutions that have devel-
oped and evolved over time. Hence they aren’t the
designs people tend to generate initially. They reflect
untold redesign and recoding as developers have
struggled for greater reuse and flexibility in their
software. Deisgn patterns capture these solutions in
a succinct and easily applied form. [2]
We now return to our discussion of Figure 2, focussing on
the association between an Aspect and a Role.
Privacy Pattern 2: Aspect-role separation. An Aspect is
influential only when it is enacting a Role in some Context.
The Role puts constraints and expectations on the range of
activity of an Aspect. When an Entity (through an Aspect) is
playing a Role, it may be able to observe and control the ac-
tivities of other Role-enacting and Aspect-displaying Entities.
Depending on the Context and the Role, it may be possible for
a Role-enacting Aspect to be identified. Such identifications
are crucially important when establishing accountabilities for
this Aspect in other Contexts, e.g. in a judicial proceeding.
The aspect-role-separation pattern allows us to express
the social and legal determinants of privacy, in a context-
dependent way. In Section 4, we develop important subclasses
of Context, for example Isolated, in which there are stereo-
typed Roles such as the Isolate and the Intruder. Each Role
is played by an Aspect which implements the interface (e.g.
Solitude) relevant to this role in this context. The interface de-
fines the stereotypical behaviours (such as introspect())
which are socially or legally expected of any Aspect enacting
this particular subclass of Role.
In a UML class diagram, an arc indicates that an instance
of a class is able to access the data and methods of another
instance. We use labels to indicate the type of access. In
particular, an arc labelled “controls” indicates that a method
could be invoked, or a data field could be written. An arc
labelled “observes” indicates that a data field could be read.
This is informal semantics. To formalise these semantics, we
could subtype an association class. However we see very little
benefit in expressing this subtyping formally, especially since
typed associations are rarely seen in UML class diagrams for
software systems.
3Fig. 3. Five subtypes of Entity, with relations of ownership, governance,
surveillance and compulsion. We model a human being as an instance of
NaturalPerson. An informally-constituted group of people is a SentientActor.
If a group of people is incorporated as a legal entity, then it is a LegalPerson.
Privacy Pattern 3: Role-context separation. Every Role is
participating in a Context. Orphaned Role objects should be
garbage-collected, because a role is ineffectual if it is not
associated with any context.
The reader may find it helpful to think of the list of Roles
in a Context as being analogous to the Dramatis Personae of
a play. One of the tasks of the director of a play is to ensure
that, whenever it is performed, all of its currently-active roles
are being enacted by some actor. It is possible for the same
actor to play multiple roles in the same play, perhaps even
simultaneously. However our first design pattern suggests that
a privacy-aware system will prevent any entity from playing a
role in any context as itself; instead, every entity is required
to put on some mask (an Aspect) whenever they are on stage.
This mask will prevent them from revealing information (such
as the actual colour of their skin) which would inappropriate
in the context of this play. The aspect of each actor must of
course conform to the role they are playing. It should not be
possible for anything to happen on the stage, unless it is being
performed by some Role defined in this play.
Privacy Pattern 4: Context-entity separation. Every Con-
text is the embodiment of some Entity. Some Entities embody
a Context.
The “embodies” association closes the loop of our founda-
tional privacy patterns, by allowing conglomerates or corpora-
tions (as structured within a Context) to behave as entities
in some higher-level context. For example, a corporation
may have many employees and a complex decision-making
apparatus. However from a legal perspective, a corporation is
answerable to a judicial authority in the context of a legal
proceedings.
III. TYPES OF ENTITY
We move now to Figure 3, which defines five subtypes
of Entity. This proliferation of entity types may seem un-
fortunate, however we cannot see how our privacy patterns
could have fewer abstract classes inheriting from Entity, while
still distinguishing privacy requirements from other types of
requirements. In Figure 3, the most general class (Actor) is
drawn at the top, and the most specific classes are at the
bottom. Please recall that in the UML, an open-ended triangle
indicates the direction of the inheritance relation between two
classes.
An Actor is a specialised form of Entity: an actor may
surveil or compel other entities, whereas any class which
inherits directly from an Entity can neither suveil nor compel.
A document is an example of an entity which is not able to
surveil or compel. A computer is an example of an entity that
is able to surveil or compel. We have introduced surveillance
and compulsion into our patterns to indicate
• how a privacy requirement could be breached, by any
actor who uses surveillance or compulsion to subvert the
one-way entity-aspect relation, and also
• how a privacy requirement could be enforced, by any
actor which is trusted to use its surveillances and com-
pulsions only to detect privacy breaches, and to respond
appropriately to any detected (or alleged) breaches.
We use callouts to express requirements, as in the SysML
profile [8] of UML [3]. Callouts are linked to a class, or to
another callout, by a dashed line. We use five stereotypes in
our annotations: «requirement», «forbiddance», «allowance»,
«obligation», and «exemption».
A «requirement» is a correctness constraint, i.e. a property
of a system which could be formally verified. For example,
the anti-slavery requirement at the bottom of Figure 3 is,
formally, a constraint on the “owns” relation of every instance
of NaturalPerson.
We use our other four stereotypes as a rough classifier of
privacy requirements. A requirement that curtails the range
of acceptable actions by an actor is a «forbiddance»; and
its text field must specify which action(s) SHALL NOT be
performed by this actor. A forbiddance may be derogated by
an attached «allowance» which specifies some action(s) which
MAY be performed. Alternatively, a privacy requirement may
be expressed as an allowance which is derogated by one or
more forbiddances.
Another common features we have observed, when re-
viewing the privacy-structures of existing systems for this
article, is that a privacy requirement curtails the range of
inactions by an actor. We use the «obligations» stereotype
on such requirements, and the accompanying text field must
specify which action(s) SHALL be performed. Derogations on
obligations are called «exemptions», and these specify actions
which MAY NOT be performed.
For logical completeness, we will allow a privacy require-
ment to be expressed as an exemption which is derogated by
some obligation(s), although to date we have not elicited any
requirement that would be naturally expressed in this format.
Figure 3 exhibits a privacy pattern of a judicial authority
4with a governance relation over the entities it recognises
as legal persons. A privacy-sensitive judical authority will
prohibit surveillance and compulsion, except in cases where
these powers are necessary to its dispensation of justice.
Privacy Pattern 5: Surveillance and compulsion are for-
bidden. Actors are generally forbidden from surveilling and
compelling other entities, however there is an important ex-
ception to this forbiddance. A judicial authority may allow
some surveillance and compulsion.
Figure 3 contains a second privacy pattern: the concept of
legal ownership, with a structural restriction against slavery.
We note, in passing, that it may be possible to develop design
patterns for all generally-accepted human rights.
Privacy Pattern 6: Entities are owned. Any legal person
may own any entity, unless the second entity is another natural
person. The legal ownership of an entity implies a legally-
enforceable right to compel, surveil, control and observe that
entity. Every entity has an owner.
We note that the “owns” relation of Figure 3 is 1-way
navigable. This models the possibility that an entity, such as
a document, does not carry a record of its current owner.
In particular systems, it might be appropriate to specify a
navigation from an entity to its owner as an «allowance», or as
a «forbiddance», if obtaining information about the ownership
of this entity is privacy-sensitive.
We note that different stakeholders will, in general, have dif-
ferent privacy requirements. During the privacy-requirements
elicitation for a system, these differences could be recorded
in stakeholder-specific callouts on a class diagram for this
system.
We also note that our privacy patterns will support many
theologies. In particular, an atheist may define a LegalPerson
that has null (or randomly-generated) method bodies; this en-
tity could serve as the owner of all entities that are not subject
to any other judicial authority. By contrast, a monotheist may
construct a class hierarchy in which God is a LegalPerson
which governs itself, and which has a JudicialAuthority over
all other JudicialAuthorities. Because privacy patterns are
suggestive rather than prescriptive, the architects of a system
may develop a class hierarchy in which some entities do not
have explicitly-represented owners.
Finally, we note that artificial persons such as corpora-
tions may make claims to privacy requirements [9], as may
informally-constituted groups such as clusters of friends, par-
ticipants in religious ceremonies, and extended families. In
such cases, the class analyst should construct an entity to
embody the claimant’s group, then attempt to map their group-
privacy claims onto the privacy patterns of the next section.
If this is infeasible, we hope the analyst will contact us with
a description of the group’s unrepresentable privacy claim, or
with any new privacy pattern they devise for its representation.
IV. STATES OF PRIVACY
We move now to Figure 1. The five interfaces in this figure
define five distinct states or modalities of privacy. Four of these
states were identified by Westin in his 1967 survey of privacy,
as understood by contemporary “anthropologists, psycholo-
gists, biologists, physicists, historians, and psychiatrists, as
Fig. 4. Privacy Pattern 7: Solitude. An entity with an aspect playing the
Isolate role is able to introspect, but is unable to control or observe any other
entity. Generally, other entities are forbidden from intruding on an isolate.
Urgent intrusions may be allowed by the governor of the isolate, or by the
societies to which the isolate belongs.
well as philosophers, lawyers, and laymen” [1]. Westin argues
that the states of solitude, intimacy, reserve, and anonymity
are recognised and protected in a wide range of cultures.
In our reductionist treatment of Westin’s conception of
privacy, we assert that any state of privacy may be claimed
by any person, or by any group of people, in any context. We
consider it the job of the requirements analyst to discover the
particular forms of privacy that are likely to be claimed by
stakeholders, and to determine which of these privacy claims
can be accepted or rejected automatically. We consider it the
job of the systems implementer to provide affordances which,
ideally, will make it easy (or even automatic) for users
• to make and withdraw claims to privacy,
• to enquire into the status of their outstanding claims,
• to resolve problematic claims as fairly and quickly as
possible, with recourse to appropriate external parties for
the most problematic claims, and
• to effectively defend privacy claims, almost always with-
out recourse to external enforcement agents, but some-
times by engaging other users of the system who have a
vested interest in this claim or this type of claim.
5Fig. 5. Privacy Pattern 8: Intimates share secrets in a secluded context.
A. Solitude
Figure 4 is a design pattern for a context which realises
the Solitude state of privacy. We elicited this pattern from the
following passage in Westin’s monograph [1]:
The first state of privacy is solitude; here the individ-
ual is separated from the group and freed from the
observation of other persons. He may be subjected
to jarring physical stimuli, such as noise, odors,
and vibrations. His peace of mind may continue to
be disturbed by physical sensations of heat, cold,
itching, and pain. He may believe that he is being
observed by God or some supernatural force, or fear
that some authority is secretly watching him. Finally,
in solitude he will be especially subject to that
familiar dialogue with the mind or conscience. But,
despite all these physical or psychological intrusions,
solitude is the most complete state of privacy that
individuals can achieve.
The Isolated context in Figure 4 is embodied in a class
of entity which we have named Isolation. This embodiment
allows an aspect of an instance of Isolation to be persistently
identifiable while it is playing a role in a surrounding context.
For example, if the surrounding context were in an airport,
it could have a guarantor of solitude who responds to claim-
Solitude() calls from nearby isolates, by offering them a rental
contract for a currently-vacant sleeping pod.
B. Intimacy
We elicit the Secluded context of Figure 5 from the follow-
ing passage in Westin [1]:
In the second state of privacy, intimacy, the indi-
vidual is acting as part of a small unit that claims
and is allowed to exercise corporate seclusion so
that it may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank re-
lationship between two or more individuals. Typical
units of intimacy are husband and wife, the family,
a friendship circle, or a work clique. Whether close
contact brings relaxed relations or abrasive hostility
depends on the personal interaction of the members,
but without intimacy a basic need of human contact
would not be met.
We derive two privacy requirements on intimates: they must
not join an existing intimate group without an invitation, and
they must not reveal anything about the intimacy to any outside
party. We add a structural requirement, that the Secret role
must be filled by an aspect of an entity that is owned by one
of the intimates.
Westin’s passage suggests that an additional requirement
may be commonly elicited: that there be some upper limit
on the size of an intimate group. This would limit the risk
that claims to seclusion are used to promote a political cause
or to serve a commercial purpose, rather than for a “close,
relaxed, and frank relationship” between a few individuals.
C. Anonymity and Reserve
Figure 6 is our most complex schema. In it, we have
modelled the states of Reserve and Anonymity in a context
(PublicSphere) which is embodied as a Society. There are
three types of actor in our PublicSphere: PublicFigures (who
have names which could be replicated in other PublicSphers),
anonymous roles (each of which is aliased to exactly one
public figure), and instances of PublicProperty (which model
newspapers, advertisements, and any other identifiable entities
which are displaying observable and controllable aspects in
the commons of this society).
The privacy requirements in this schema are restrictions
on the behaviour of public figures. They are expected, by
their society, to regulate their own behaviour – and that of
any anonymous aliases they may be using. We elicited the
state of Anonymity from the following passage in Westin’s
monograph [1].
The third state of privacy, anonymity, occurs when
the individual is in public places or performing
public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from
identification and surveillance. He may be riding
a subway, attending a ball game, or walking the
streets; he is among people and knows that he
is being observed; but unless he is a well-known
celebrity, he does not expect to be personally iden-
tified and held to the full rules of behavior and
role that would operate if he were known to those
observing him. In this state the individual is able to
merge into the “situational landscape.” Knowledge
or fear that one is under systematic observation in
public places destroys the sense of relaxation and
freedom that men seek in open spaces and public
arenas.
Still another kind of anonymity is the publication
of ideas anonymously. Here the individual wants to
present some idea publicly to the community or to
6Fig. 6. Privacy Pattern 9: A public sphere with Anonymity and Reserve. The members of a public sphere, collectively, are embodied as a society which self-
regulates its conceptions of anonymity and reserve, and which administers all public property. Societal sanctions include “naming and shaming”. Individuals
may appeal to their governor, if they feel wrongly treated by their society.
a segment of it, but does not want to be universally
identified at once as the author-especially not by
the authorities, who may be forced to take action
if they “know” the perpetrator. The core of each
of these types of anonymous action is the desire of
individuals for times of “public privacy.”
We elicited the state of Reserve from the following passage.
Reserve, the fourth and most subtle state of privacy,
is the creation of a psychological barrier against un-
wanted intrusion; this occurs when the individual’s
need to limit communication about himself is pro-
tected by the willing discretion of those surrounding
him. Most of our lives are spent not in solitude
or anonymity but in situations of intimacy and in
group settings where we are known to others. Even
in the most intimate relations, communication of self
to others is always incomplete and is based on the
need to hold back some parts of one’s self as either
too personal and sacred or too shameful and profane
to express. This circumstance gives rise to what
Simmel called “reciprocal reserve and indifference,”
the relation that creates “mental distance” to protect
the personality. This creation of mental distance – a
variant of the concept of “social distance” – takes
place in every sort of relationship under rules of
social etiquette; it expresses the individual’s choice
to withhold or disclose information – the choice that
is the dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interper-
sonal relations. Simmel identified this tension within
the individual as being between “self-revelation and
self-restraint” and, within society, between “trespass
and discretion.” The manner in which individuals
claim reserve and the extent to which it is respected
or disregarded by others is at the heart of securing
meaningful privacy in the crowded, organization-
dominated settings of modern industrial society and
urban life, and varies considerably from culture to
culture [1].
The boundaries of a reserve may be changed, from time to
time, by the active members of that society. This implies that
elicitations of a reserve should be revalidated, and possibly
revised, as the society evolves.
As with most other types of privacy requirements, we do
not expect the requirements associated with reserves to be
enforced accurately by a computerised system. However, it
would be feasible to design a system in which a computerised
actor is a PublicFigure in a society, and to advertise (via a
release to PublicProperty) the availability of its isOffensive()
7method. If the members of the society come to a general
agreement that this method has few false-positives, then it
could be reliably used as a detector of some forms of offensive
behaviour in that society. If it is feasible to develop a socially-
acceptable automated response mechanism for automatically-
detected violations, then the social reserve is being technically
enforced. However in any case where the automated responses
are socially inappropriate, we would say that the social reserve
is being violated by this computerised system – and we would
expect a corrective response via social, legal, or economic
pressure on the owner of the system.
The governmental role in the public sphere is played by
a JudicialAuthority, as originally defined in Figure 3 and as
referenced in the bottom callout of Figure 6.
The two forbiddances in Figure 6 are illustrative but not
prescriptive. The first is a general statement of reserve, framed
in a manner that suggests a common-law approach to its
definition whereby the isOffensive() method of a normative
public figure such as a judge or kaumatua (a revered elder,
in Maori) is used to determine whether or not a sanction is
appropriate. The second is supportive of anonymity, in the
sense that actors are forbidden from assisting each other in
piercing the veil of anonymity. The allowance in this figure is
intended to suggest the social conventions which distinguish
an unoffensive publication from an actionable breach of a
generally-acknowledged reserve.
We have not specified, in this figure, whether the anonymity
is linkable, that is, whether the binding of an aspect to an
Anon instance is persistent (so that an Anon instance has a
pseudonym that is linked to a reputational history), or (in
an extreme form of unlinkability) each Anon instance acts at
most once and its enacting entity is careful not to disclose
any information about their prior anonymous actions. The
implementation of the authenticateAnonym() method would
greatly affect linkability, for example if it always returns false
then the Anon instances would be offering no assistance to
anyone who is attempting to determine their identity. At the
other extreme, an authenticateAnonym() call might return a
cryptographically-sound proof of a claim to an identity that is
specified, in the parameters of the authenticalAnonym() call,
as an instance of an Anon in a PublicSphere.
D. Confidence
We have added “confidence” to Westin’s list of states. This
fifth state allows our schemas to directly represent a concep-
tion of privacy which has been adopted by many technologists
and policy analysts. In this conception of privacy, sometimes
called “information privacy” [10], an individual’s control over
the confidentiality of their personal information is considered
to be the primary (or even the only) meaning of the word
“privacy”.
We elicited the Confidence state of privacy from the EU’s
Data Protection Directive. Figure 8 is our reductionist interpre-
tation of this complex directive. Each member state of the EU
will comply with this directive in its own way; but generally
speaking, each member state is obligated to impose a duty of
care (i.e. a set of obligations) on every controller of personal
Fig. 8. Privacy Pattern 10: Confidence. The state of Confidence is structurally
similar to the state of Intimacy, however the context for Confidence has a
very pronounced asymmetry between the Truster and the Trustee, whereas
all intimates have equivalent powers. A Trustee has a duty of care for the
Truster’s asset.
data who falls within their jurisidction. The legal situation of
a controller is thus roughly comparable to that of a trustee, in
a trust which holds the personally-identifiable information of
the data subjects as its asset.
We note that our schema for Confidence models an informal
trust, not a legal trust. A legal trust is a specialisation of
our privacy pattern for Confidence such that the trust is a
LegalActor, and not merely a SentientActor. Generally, a
JudicialAuthority requires all Trustees of its legally-registered
trusts to be LegalActors within its jurisdiction.
E. Corporation
In Figure 8 we depict a corporation as an identifiable
entity in our class hierarchy. We do not elicit any privacy
requirements from this depiction, however we include this
diagram in our article because corporations are often cast as
antagonists or protagonists in contemporary discourse about
privacy.
V. DISCUSSION
The dozens of classes and relations defined in this article
are sufficient to support our initial set of privacy patterns.
We elicited these privacy patterns by analysing texts, such as
Westin’s monograph [1], that describe various conceptions of
privacy.
We do not imagine that our initial set of privacy patterns
is complete. Instead, we think that libraries of design patterns
must always be open to addition, as new types of requirements
provoke system architects to create novel solutions which can
be generalised for re-use by other architects. To this end: we
invite the reader to analyse textual descriptions of privacy
8Fig. 7. A corporation with registered directors.
requirements, and to conduct analyses of additional privacy-
sensitive systems, in a quest for the discovery of additional
privacy patterns of general relevance.
Finally, we invite the reader to consider whether it might be
helpful, in their context, to extend the UML use-case diagram
so that it is expressive of what we might call “privacy cases”.
We have some initial ideas on how this might be done, and
would welcome collaborators in this endeavour.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many aspects of this article were shaped by our enjoyable
and enlightening discussions of identity, access, and entitle-
ment within The Jericho Forum, from 2005 to 2012.
The figures in this article were prepared with open-source
software ArgoUML [11].
REFERENCES
[1] A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum, 1967.
[2] E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides, Design patterns:
Elements of reusable object-oriented software. Addison-Wesley, 1994.
[3] OMG Unified Modeling Language (OMG UML, Version 2.5), Object
Management Group, Sep. 2013.
[4] M. Fowler, UML Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Standard Object
Modeling Language, 3rd ed. Addison-Wesley, 2004.
[5] C. Larman, Applying UML and Patterns: An Introduction to Object-
Oriented Analysis and Design and Iterative Development, 3rd ed.
Pearson Professional, 2004.
[6] K. Cameron, “Laws of identity in brief,” Jan. 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://www.identityblog.com/?p=353
[7] The Jericho Forum, “”identity” commandments.” [Online]. Avail-
able: https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/Jericho%20Forum%
20Identity%20Commandments%20v1.0.pdf
[8] OMG Systems Modeling Language (OMG SysML, Version 1.3), Object
Management Group, Jun. 2012.
[9] E. Pollman, “A corporate right of privacy,” Minnesota Law Review,
vol. 99, no. 1, p. 56 pp., April 2014.
[10] J. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technol-
ogy. Cornell University Press, 1997.
[11] J. Robbins et al., “ArgoUML v0.34,” 2011. [Online]. Available:
argouml.tigris.org
